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AMERICAN DEPOSIT CORP. v. SCHA CHT: YET
ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO LIMIT NATIONAL
BANKS' POWERS TO SELL NONDEPOSIT
INVESTMENT PRODUCTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent changes in the financial services industry have threatened both the
profitability and the viability of national banks in the United States.
Unregulated nonbank entities provide services once offered exclusively by
banks.' New financial products, such as money market mutual funds
("MMMFs")2 and cash management accounts ("CMAs")3 have proven very
successful in competing with traditional banking services. Further, many
former bank customers now rely on the securities industry to meet their
investment needs, because federal regulations prohibit banks from providing
many underwriting and distribution services.4
1. For example, Sears opened financial centers offering insurance, securities, real estate, check
cashing, and credit card services. Emetic Fischer, Banking and Insurance-Should Ever the Twain Meet?, 71
NEB. L. REV. 726, 771 n.204 (1992). Similarly, "American Express, aside from credit card services, offered
insurance, investment banking, and banking services through a Swiss bank." Id.
Congress also authorized thrift institutions to make certain consumer loans and provide negotiable order
of withdrawal ("NOW") accounts, which are interest-bearing accounts. Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act ("DIDMCA"), Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 204-205, 303, 94 Stat. 132, 143 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3503-3504 (1988)). In the late 1970s, when nominal interest rates soared and banks were not
allowed to pay interest on checking accounts, many bank customers transferred their money from demand
deposits in banks to NOW accounts in thrift institutions. JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER,
BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 31 (1992). This "hemorrhage" of funds created a crisis in the banking
industry, because banks were at a severe competitive disadvantage to other financial institutions. Id. Today,
interest rates are effectively deregulated throughout the banking industry. Id.
2. An MMMvF, although not a demand deposit, is similar to a traditional checking account because it
allows check writing privileges. Fischer, supra note 1, at 772. At the time they were created, MMMFs were
very popular, because they could pay higher interest rates than banks were allowed to pay on similar
deposits, because banks were subject to interest rate ceilings set by Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R1 pt. 217 (1992).
Id. By the 1980s, however, Congress recognized that banks had been losing money to more liquid
investments such as the MMMFs and enacted legislation to phase out the interest rate ceilings by 1986. See
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 204-205, 94 Stat.
143 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3503-3504 (1982)).
3. A CMA combines the features of a securities brokerage account, a money market fund, a checking
account with a bank, and a debit card issued by the same bank Fischer, supra note 1, at 772. When the
owner of a CMA purchases securities, writes a check, or uses his debit card, the funds are automatically
withdrawn and credited to the payee's account. Id. at 772 n.209.
4. See infra note 7 for a discussion of Glass-Steagall's ban on underwriting activities. In October
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In response to these competitive pressures, national banks have attempted
to expand and diversify their products and activities. One such example of an
innovative new bank product is the Retirement Certificate of Deposit
("Retirement CD") marketed by Blackfeet National Bank.' Though named a
certificate of deposit, a traditional banking product the Retirement CD is very
similar to an annuity, an insurance product.6 Although no federal legislation
specifically prohibits national banks from engaging in insurance activities,
banking and insurance have traditionally been legally separate industries.7
In NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Co.,8 the Supreme Court recently held that annuities are investment products
that national banks are authorized to broker.9 If the Retirement CD is
classified as an annuity, banks will have the power to market and sell the
product.'0 However, most state insurance regulations define "insurance" to
1995, Rep. James A. Leach introduced legislation that would repeal the Glass-Steagall Act and lift the ban
on underwriting activities to ease the burden on financial institutions. See infra notes 137-45 and
accompanying text (discussing this proposed legislation).
Because banks are unable to provide underwriting services, many people are placing their savings in
pension and retirement plans. See William M. Isaac & Melanie L. Fein, Facing the Future-Life Without
Glass-Steagall, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 281, 293 (1988). The professional nonbank managers of these finds
divert funds from banks to the securities markets. Id. In addition, banks have become increasingly unable to
meet the modem financial needs of their large corporate customers. Fischer, supra note 1, at 773. Rather than
relying on bank loans, many large corporate entities meet their credit needs by issuing commercial paper and
securitizing their assets. Id. Because Glass-Steagall prohibits banks from providing underwriting services,
corporate customers have looked to the securities industry to meet their financial needs. Id. at 773-74.
5. For a detailed description of the Retirement CD, see infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
6. For the analysis of the features of the Retirement CD, see infra notes 85-122 and accompanying
text.
7. The Glass-Steagall Act strictly prohibits national banks from underwriting securities but does not
regulate the insurance activities of national banks. See The Banking Act of 1933,48 Stat. 162, 184, 188, 189,
194 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1988)). Fischer explained that the separation
between banking and insurance resulted from the "generally accepted view that banks should not be allowed
to engage in nonbanking activities." Fischer, supra note 1, at 784; see also Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep.
Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968) (concluding that banks should not engage in insurance-related
activities). As Fischer discussed, because of the lack of comprehensive legislation, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC'), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC'), the Federal
Reserve, and state authorities reached conflicting decisions as to the scope of bank insurance powers.
Fischer, supra note 1, at 784.
8. 115S.Ct.810(1995).
9. Id. at 817. For further discussion of NationsBank, see infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. If
the Retirement CD fell within the definition of a "security" under federal and state securities laws and
regulations, national banks would have to comply with applicable securities laws. A discussion of securities
laws and regulations is beyond the scope of this Recent Development
10. In NationsBank, the Supreme Court granted broad deference to the Comptroller's conclusion that
annuities are investment products that banks are authorized to broker. Id. at 817. However, there is some
question as to whether the Court would uphold the Comptroller's determination that a national bank may
underwrite products such as the Retirement CD. In footnote 4 of the NationsBank opinion, Justice Ginsburg
noted that the Comptroller limited his ruling to situations where the bank "will act only as agent... will not
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include annuities for purposes of state insurance regulation." Consequently,
even if national banks are authorized to sell new products such as the
Retirement CD, they may be subject to the full range of state insurance
regulations. These onerous regulations would further strain the stability and
profitability of national banks.
Using the Retirement CD as an example, this Recent Development
examines the conflict between national bank powers and state insurance
regulations. Part II explains federal regulation of banking activities and the
powers of national banks. Part 111 discusses state insurance regulations and
the concept of reverse preemption, which sometimes allows such regulations
to preempt federal laws. Part IV examines American Deposit Corp. v.
Schacht,"2 a recent case in which the Seventh Circuit held that the Retirement
CD is an annuity for purposes of state insurance regulation."3 Finally, Part V
discusses the reaction to the Retirement CD and Schacht's impact on national
banks' ability to expand and diversify.
II. THE POWERS OF NATIONAL BANKS AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF
BANKING ACTIVITIES
A. Federal Regulation of Banks
1. Structure
The United States has a dual banking system. Banks may elect to seek a
charter under either state or federal law. Generally, state laws regulate the
have a principal stake in annuity contracts and therefore will incur no interest rate or actuarial risks." Id. at
815 n.4 (emphasis added) (citing to Mar. 21, 1991 Interpretative Letter from the OCC). Thus, NationsBank
did not address the issue of whether national banks may underwrite annuities.
The Court emphasized that it "should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory
statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute." Id. at 813 (citing Clarke v.
Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 338,403-04 (1987) (quoting Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,
626-27 (1971))). According to the Court, because the NBA is silent as to whether banks may broker or
underwrite annuities, the Comptroller had discretion to authorize the activity. Id. at 813-14, 814 n.2.
However, the Comptroller's discretion "must be kept within reasonable grounds. Ventures distant from
dealing in financial investment instruments ... may exceed those bounds." Id. at 814 n.2. Thus, the key
question would be whether the Comptroller's determination that banks may underwrite the Retirement CD is
reasonable.
11. See infra note 99.
12. No. 95-2462, 1996 WL 252869 (7th Cir. May 13, 1996).
13. Id.at*10.
19961
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activities of state-chartered banks.14 National banks are chartered under the
authority of the National Bank Act of 1864 ("NBA"). 5 The NBA established
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC" or "Comptroller")1 6 to
screen applicants for charters, issue charters, supervise the national banks, and
regulate the currency. 7 Although state and national banks offer similar
products and services, they may be subject to very different regulatory
structures by virtue of their governing laws.'
In addition to the NBA, nationally chartered banks are subject to other
sources of federal regulation. In 1913, Congress enacted the Federal Reserve
Act, 9 which created a system of twelve Federal Reserve Banks, each of
which operates, in effect, as a central bank for its geographic region.2" The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System2 ' (the "Fed") supervises
these banks,22 and all banks operating under a national charter are required to
join the Federal Reserve System.23
14. A discussion of state banking laws and the insurance powers ofstate-chartered banks is beyond the
scope of this Recent Development.
15. Act of June 3, 1864 ("National Bank Act"), 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
16. The OCC is the federal agency within the Department of Treasury that charters and supervises the
activities of national banks and is charged with interpreting the NBA. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, THE
REGULATION OF BANKING 41. 62 (1992). Almost all significant actions taken by national banks, including
chartering, establishment of branches, and changes in corporate control must be approved by the
Comptroller. Id. at 62. The Comptroller also has supervisory authority over the day-to-day activities of
national banks, such as loan and investment policies of the banks and bank trust activities. Id. National bank
examiners supervise banks by conducting periodic on-site examinations. Id.
17. National Bank Act § 8.
18. Generally, national banks are also subject to the laws of the state in which they are located, unless
the state law expressly conflicts with federal law or interferes with the federal regulatory scheme. MAcEY &
MILLER, supra note 1, at 134-35. The Supreme Court, in evaluating whether state or federal roles apply to
national banks, noted that daily banking operations, such as making contracts and collecting debts, are
governed more by state than federal law. National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. 353,362 (1869).
19. The Federal Reserve Act, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522).
20. Id.; MALLOY, supra note 16, at 66. Each Reserve Bank is a separate corporate entity, the
stockholders of which are its member banks. Id. at 67.
21. The Federal Reserve System consists of the Fed and its staff, the Federal Reserve Banks, the
Federal Open Market Committee, the Federal Advisory Council, and the member banks, which include
commercial banks that are required or elect to join. MALLOY, supra note 16, at 66.
22. The Fed is made up of seven members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 12
U.S.C. § 241 (1988). Each member is appointed for a 14-year term, and the terms are staggered so that one
member's term expires every two years. Id. The Fed supervises and examines the Federal Reserve Banks,
national banks, and state-chartered member banks. MALLOY, supra note 16, at 66-67. In addition, the Fed
monitors the availability of credit and administers federal laws concerning reserve requirements and interest
rates applicable to bank deposits. Id. at 67. These credit and monetary functions are beyond the scope of this
Recent Development.
23. 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-222 (1988). State banks may also elect to join the Federal Reserve System as
member banks. Id. § 321. Although state member banks still derive their powers from the laws of the state of
incorporation, they become subject to the jurisdiction of the Fed. 12 U.S.C. § 330 (1988) (stating that "any
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Following the 1929 stock market crash, Congress enacted the Banking
Act of 1933 ("1933 Act' or "Glass-Steagall Act) 2 4 to effect the recovery and
reform of the struggling banking system.2" The 1933 Act made two
substantial revisions to the pre-Depression banking law. First, it strictly
prohibited national banks from underwriting securities,26 a common practice
before the Depression and a contributing factor to widespread bank failures
during the Depression. Next, the 1933 Act established the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC").28 The FDIC insures customer deposits up to
a specified amount, currently $100,000.29
bank becoming a member of the Federal Reserve System shall retain its full charter and statutory rights as a
State bank... and may continue to exercise all corporate powers granted it by the State in which it was
created").
24. TheBankingActofl933§§ 16,20-21,32.
25. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 1, at 22.
26. See supra note 7. Glass-Steagall's ban on underwriting activities carries over into several sections
of the NBA, most notably:
a) Section 16 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24) prohibits national banks from buying or selling
securities for their own account.
b) Section 20 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 377) restricts national banks from investing in debt
securities.
c) Section 21 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 378) prohibits national banks from underwriting or issuing
securities, with exceptions.
d) Section 32 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 78) bans national banks from affiliating with investment
banking firms.
These Glass-Steagall provisions also apply to state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System.
The language of U.S.C. §§ 78 and 377 makes them applicable to state member banks. Section 24 is applied
through § 335, see 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1988) (extending section 24's limitations on national banks to state
banks), and § 378 is applicable to organizations that include state member banks.
27. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 1, at 22. The Glass-Steagall Act erected a wall between
commercial banking and investment banking. Id. The Act barred commercial banks that are members of the
Federal Reserve System from engaging in the securities business and prohibited securities firms from
accepting deposits or affiliating with deposit-taking institutions. Id.
28. Banking Act of 1933 § 8. .
29. Currently, the FDIC insures up to $100,000 of the total amount deposited by a customer at a
depository institution. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(aX) (1988). For purposes of determining the amount of deposits
insured, the FDIC will aggregate the total amount of deposits a customer makes at a depository institution,
but the FDIC will not aggregate deposits that a customer holds at different institutions. See 12 U.S.C. §
1821(aXXC) (1994). National banks and state member banks of the Federal Reserve System are required to
obtain insurance from the FDIC. See 12 U.S.C. § 1814 (1988).
Under 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (1988), insured nonmember state banks are also subject to the jurisdiction of
the FDIC, which restricts activities inconsistent with the purpose of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
Investment Co. Inst. V. FDIC, 815 F.2d 1540, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Examples of restricted activities
include guaranteeing obligations of others (excluding letters of credit in the ordinary course of banking
business), becoming a surety on the obligations of others, and certifying title to real estate. See 12 C.F.R. §
332.1 (1992) and 12 C.FR. pt. 337 (1996) for examples ofrestricted activities.
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2. Protecting Depositors and Customers ofNational Banks
Federal banking regulations are structured to protect the depositors and
customers of national banks.3" To effect this goal, the federal banking system
relies on specific types of regulatory mechanisms. First, national banks must
meet chartering and capitalization requirements.3' Second, banks are
restricted in their use of depositors' funds. Finally, federal regulations
restrict the permissible activities of national banks.33
Both the NBA and the regulations promulgated by the Comptroller under
the NBA govern the formation of national banks.34 Bank organizers must
prepare articles of association and file them with the Comptroller.35 In
addition, the NBA requires bank organizers to provide a minimum capital
infusion.36 Once these requirements are met, the Comptroller determines
which applicants will be allowed to "commence ... business."37 If granted a
charter, national banks must join the Federal Reserve System and obtain
FDIC insurance before opening their doors.3
When national banks commence business and begin accepting deposits,
federal regulations restrict banks' ability to use depositors' funds. The Fed
administers reserve requirements, 39 which are designed to act as a cushion
against sudden demands for withdrawal of deposits.4" In addition, FDIC
30. Fischer explains that consumer protection includes all policies "aimed at protecting depositors'
funds, insuring competitive pricing, and insuring that banks act as relatively impartial fiduciaries for the
public" and that the safety of deposits is "a primary objective" of banking policy. Fischer, supra note 1, at
739. The macroeconomic goals of federal regulation, including credit distribution and capital apportionment,
and the monetary policies implemented by the Fed are beyond the scope of this Recent Development
31. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text for a discussion offederal chartering requirements.
32. For an explanation of the restrictions on banks' use of deposits, see infra notes 39.41 and
accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (explaining the limits on banking activities).
34. MALLOY, supra note 16, at 154.
35. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-22 (1988); MALLOY, supra note 16, at 154. Applicants must also file extensive
supporting data outlining, among other things, their plans of operations and showing adequate capitalization.
WILLIAM A. LOVEIT, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTI ONS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 121 (3d ed. 1992). The
OCC also requires information on market cireumstances in order to demonstrate that the market can handle
another banking institution. Id.
36. 12 U.S.C. § 51 (1988); MALLOY, supra note 16, at 154. The minimum capital infusion ranges from
$50,000 to $200,000, depending upon the location of the bank. See 12 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 26 (1988).
38. See 12 U.S.C. § 222 (1988); MALLOY, supra note 16, at 204-05.
39. 12U.S.C. §461(a),(b)(2)-(5),(c)(1988).
40. MALLOY, supra note 16, at 435.
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insurance further protects customer deposits.41
Finally, federal regulations restrict certain activities of national banks.
When making loans, national banks face limits on the aggregate amount of
loans they can make to any one borrower, limits on certain types of loans, and
prohibitions against usurious interest rates.42 Banks are also generally
prohibited from guaranteeing the obligations of third parties,43 restricted as to
the real property interests they may acquire,' and regulated when they
exercise trust powers. 45  In addition, Glass-Steagall severely limits the
underwriting and securities activities of national banks.46
B. The "Incidental Powers" Clause
Despite these limits on the activities of national banks, the NBA, in § 24
(Seventh), sets forth a specific list of enumerated powers and authorizes
national banks to "carry on the business of banking. ' 7 Specifically, § 24
(Seventh) authorizes national banks "[to exercise . . . all such incidental
powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking' and to
"receiv[e] deposits."'48 Although § 24 (Seventh) specifically states that banks
cannot underwrite any issue of securities or stock,49 it is silent as to the
powers of national banks to sell or underwrite insurance products, such as
41. See supra note 29.
42. MALLOY, supra note 16, at 382.
43. Id. at 487 (stating that § 24 (Seventh) generally does not grant national banks the power to issue
guarantees). Ironically, national banks are allowed to issue standby letters of credit, which are "in essence
only guarantees." Dunn v. McCoy, 113 F.2d 587, 588 (3d Cir. 1940). A letter of credit is "[a]n engagement
by a bank or other person made at the request of a customer that the issuer will honor ... [a demand] for
payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit" BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 903-04
(6th ed. 1990). A standby letter of credit is one which commits the issuer, the bank, to honor the credit only
upon evidence or a declaration of the customer's default in the underlying transaciion with the beneficiary.
Id. at 904.
44. See 12 U.S.C. § 29(1988).
45. See 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1988); 12 C.F.R pt9 (1995).
46. See supra notes 7,26.
47. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This section is also referred to as § 16 of the
Glass-Steagall Act
48. Id. In § 24 (Seventh), the National Bank Act provides that national banks shall have power-
To exercise... all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking;
by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of
debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money
on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes.... The business of dealing
in securities and stock by the [bank] shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and
stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for
its own account, and the [bank] shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock ....
12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
49. Id.
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annuities. °
In 1995, the Supreme Court dramatically expanded the "incidental"
powers of national banks to sell financial products not specifically
enumerated in § 24 (Seventh). In NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable
Annuity Life Insurance Co.,5' the Court held that national banks may serve as
agents in the sale of annuities, because such a service is incidental to the
business of banking. 2 Moreover, the Court expressly held that the "business
of banking is not limited to the enumerated powers in § 24 (Seventh) and that
the Comptroller therefore has discretion to authorize activities beyond those
specifically enumerated [in the NBA]."53
In NationsBank, the Court avoided a discussion of whether national banks
have the power to sell insurance. The Court deferred to the Comptroller's
conclusion that, for purposes of § 24 (Seventh), annuities are investment
products rather than insurance products.54 The Court recognized that annuities
might be defined as insurance products in other contexts, such as state
insurance regulation, but it agreed that § 24 (Seventh) authorizes national
banks to sell annuities because they "serve an important investment purpose
and are functionally similar to other investments that banks typically sell. 5
50. See infra note 56 for an explanation of the "small town" provision in this rule. Even though § 24
(Seventh) does not explicitly grant national banks the power to sell annuities, many national banks do sell
annuities and other insurance products. In a 1994 article, William Isaac stated that approximately 25% of
national banks currently sell annuity products. William M. Isaac, Banks May Be Giving Up the War if They
Don't Win Insurance Battle, Am. BANKER, Jan. 13, 1994, at 22. Annuity sales by those banks totalled $7.7
billion in 1992 and generated fee income of $285 million. Id. Data from the March 1994 call reports
submitted to the Federal Reserve Board showed that over 1500 insured commercial banks offered annuities
to their customers. Michelle A. Clarke, Call Reports Show Surprisingly Few Banks Selling Funds, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 25, 1994, at 12. To deny banks the power to sell annuities would deprive them of an
important profit source and provide a boon to the insurance industry.
51. 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995).
52. Id. at 817. The OCC had previously authorized national banks to broker annuity contracts to their
customers. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 499 [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
83,090 (Feb. 12, 1990); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 331 [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,501 (April 4, 1985) [hereinafter 1985 Letter].
53. NationsBank, 115 S. Ct. at 814 n.2. The Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. ('VALIC"), which
sells annuities, brought the suit to challenge the Comptroller's decision that national banks may sell
annuities. Id. at 814. VALIC argued that the enumerated activities listed in § 24 (Seventh) after the words
"business of banking" are exclusive and that national banks are confined to those activities. Id.
54. Id. at 817. In the 1985 Letter, the Comptroller noted that the Supreme Court had previously
determined that variable annuities are securities. 1985 Letter, supra note 52 (citing SEC v. United Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959)); see also 1
JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACICE § 84, at 295 (1981) (arguing that
"[a]nnuity contract[s] must... be recognized as investments rather than as insurance"); D. SHAPIRO & T.
STREiFF, ANNtmES 7 (1992) (explaining that in contrast to life insurance, "[a]nnuities ... are primarily
investment products").
55. NationsBank 115 S. Ct. at 817. For a similar conclusion with respect to state-chartered banks, see
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Because it defined annuities as investment products under § 24 (Seventh), the
Court did not examine the power of national banks to sell insurance.5 6 The
Court also limited its holding by noting that the Comptroller's decision is
limited to situations where national banks serve as agents and not as
underwriters subject to interest rate and actuarial risks."
Further, the Court did not discuss the issue of whether national banks are
subject to state insurance regulations if they sell insurance products.
Presumably, if the bank acts only as an agent in the sale of insurance
products, the actual underwriter of such products follows all applicable state
insurance regulations. Thus, there is no need for the broker to be concerned
with such regulations when selling insurance products to consumers, because
the products already comply with state regulations.
New York State Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. New York State Banking Dep't, 632 N.E.2d 876 (1994)
(analyzing the language of a New York statute, which is identical to the language in § 24 (Seventh) and
concluding that state-chartered banks may sell annuities pursuant to their "incidental" powers).
56. The NBA is silent on the issue of whether all national banks are authorized to sell insurance.
However, section 92, the "small town" provision, authorizes banks located in towns of less than 5000
inhabitants to broker certain types ofinsurance. Section 92 provides:
In addition to the powers now vested by law in [national banks] ... any such [bank] located and
doing business in any place the population of which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants ...
may... act as the agent fbr any fire, life, or other insurance company authorized by the authorities
of the State in which said bank is located to do business in said State, by soliciting and selling
insurance and collecting premiums on policies issued by such company ....
12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Although banks must be located in a city of less than 5000 inhabitants, nothing prevents banks from
selling products in other markets. Independent Ins. Agents of Am. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C. Cir.
1993). Thus, a bank may establish a branch in a city with less than 5000 inhabitants and sell insurance to
customers everywhere. See id.
Some courts have argued that section 92, by negative implication, precludes banks in towns of more
than 5000 inhabitants from selling insurance. See, eg., American Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150,
157 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2959 (1993) (holding that section 92 precludes banks in towns of
greater than 5000 from selling title insurance); Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010,
1013 (5th Cir. 1968) (same).
The Supreme Court did not reach this issue in NationsBank because it determined that annuities are
investment products rather than insurance products. 115 S. Ct. at 817. However, other courts have held that
the powers granted in § 24 (Seventh) are supplementary to section 92 and that section 92 is not the exclusive
source of banks' power to sell insurance. See, e.g., Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d
1164, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980) (holding that section 92 does not prohibit
national banks from selling credit life insurance and that this activity was authorized by the incidental powers
clause of § 24 (Seventh)).
57. NationsBank 115 S. Ct at815 nA.
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III. STATE REGULATION OF INSURANCE AND REVERSE PREEMPTION
UNDER MCCARRAN-FERGUSON
A. State Insurance Regulations and McCarran-Ferguson
States have broad powers to regulate the insurance industry and the sale of
insurance products. 8 In 1945, Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act
("McCarran-Ferguson") 59 to protect most state insurance regulations from
preemption by federal laws." Section 1012 of McCarran-Ferguson, which
establishes a system of reverse preemption, prevents federal law from
impairing state regulatory schemes unless Congress explicitly declares that
the federal law preempts state insurance regulations or the federal law relates
to the "business of insurance." 6'
Laws enacted "for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance"
consist of those intended to adjust or control the business of insurance.6'
58. 19 APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 54 § 10321, at 1 (1982). The state derives its right to
regulate the insurance industry from its police powers, because the business of insurance affects the rights of
all citizens of the state. Id. § 10321, at 8. The only limit on a state's power to regulate insurance is that the
regulations must be reasonably related to the public interest and not be arbitrary or impermissibly
discriminatory. Id. § 10325, at 50.
59. Act ofMar. 9, 1945, ch. 20, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988)).
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1988). McCarran-Ferguson was enacted in response to the Supreme Court's
ruling that insurance is a matter of interstate commerce subject to regulation by Congress. See United States
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Congress enacted McCarran-Ferguson to ensure
that states would retain broad regulatory authority over the "business of insurance" and to exempt the
"business of insurance" from federal antitrust laws. See United States Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe, 113 S. Ct.
2202,2210 (1993) (citing Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,218 n.18 (1979)).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976). Section 1012 states that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance... unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance ..." Id For a definition of the
"business of insurance," see infra notes 62-63. Although McCan-anFerguson allows states to regulate
insurance free from Commerce Clause violations, states must continue to follow other constitutional
requirements. 19 APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 53, § 10325, at 53.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), for example, regulates many
employee benefit plans and the personal insurance connected with them. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. (1994).
McCarman-Ferguson does not preclude federal regulation under ERISA, even if state regulations also apply,
because ERISA specifically relates to the business of insurance. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 114 S. Ct 517, 525 (1993). Although ERISA allows for dual state and federal
regulation, ERISA preempts state regulations when the two schemes conflict. Id.
62. Fabe, 113 S. Ct. at 2210. In Fabe, the Court relied on its decision in Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v.
Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982), in which the Court defined the "business of insurance" as being composed of
practices and activities that satisfy the following criteria: "[flirst, whether the practice has the effect of
transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and the insured, and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within
the insurance industry." Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129.
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Specifically, such laws include state statutes aimed at directly or indirectly
protecting or regulating the relationship between the insurance company and
its policyholder.63 A law regulating the actual performance of the insurance
contract, for example, would fall within the definition of a law "enacted for
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance."'
B. Section 92 of the NBA Preempts State Anti-Affiliation Statutes
In an attempt to prevent national banks from selling insurance products
such as the Retirement CD, twenty-four states enacted anti-affiliation
regulations, which prohibit banks from affiliating with insurance companies
or selling insurance products.6" Relying on McCarran-Ferguson, state
insurance regulators argued that national banks could not sell insurance,
because the NBA does not preempt the anti-affiliation statutes.66
In Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson,6' the Supreme Court held
that section 92 of the NBA, which allows national banks in cities of less than
5000 inhabitants to sell insurance,68 preempts state anti-affiliation statutes.69
63. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969); see also American
Gen. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 359 F. Supp. 887 (D.C. Tex. 1973), affid, 496 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1974). In addition to
the relationship between the insurer and the insured, the District Court of Virginia examined factors such as
the language and content of the insurance policy and the financial reliability of an insurance company in
determining whether a state statute regulates the "business of insurance." American Family Life Assurance
Co. of Columbus v. Planned Mktg. Assocs., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 1141, 1145 (D.C. Va. 1975). Even if state
laws have an impact beyond state borders and would normally be struck under the Commerce Clause,
McCaxran-Ferguson allows such state regulations to stand. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Huff, 256 N.W.2d
17,21 (Iowa 1977).
64. Fabe,113S.Ctat2210.
65. As of April, 1996, some 24 states had anti-affiliation regulations that might have prohibited the
affiliation of depository institutions and insurance agencies. Linda Greenhouse, Ruling Backs Banks' Sales of
Insurance: High Court Overturns Prohibitions by States, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1996, at C1, C6. These states
included Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, yermont, and West Virginia. Id.
66. See, ag., Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388, 391 (6th Cir. 1994) (regulators arguing
that McCarran-Ferguson "immunizes" anti-affiliation statutes from preemption by the NBA), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1350 (1996); Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631, 633 (11th Cir. 1995),
(regulators ordering bank to cease insurance activities), rev'd, Barnett Bank of Marion Co. v. Nelson, 64
U.S.L.W. 4161 (1996).
67. 64 U.S.L.W. 4161 (1996).
68. For the text of section 92, see supra note 56.
69. Barnett Bank, 64 U.S.L.W. at 4165. This holding comports with an OCC opinion letter that
concluded that state anti-affiliation statutes are preempted to the extent they prevent national banks from
selling annuities. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 475 [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 83,012 (Mar. 22, 1989). Further, the OCC determined that state insurance licensing laws are
preempted as they apply to a national bank's annuity sales. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 623 [1993-94
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) IT 83,505 (May 10, 1993).
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The state statute at issue in Barnett Bank prohibited insurance agents
affiliated with financial institutions from engaging in insurance activities.7" In
effect, the statute barred almost all banks from selling insurance."
The Court in Barnett Bank concluded that the anti-affiliation statute was in
irreconcilable conflict with section 92 of the NBA, because section 92
authorizes national banks to engage in insurance activities that the statute
expressly forbids. 2 The Court rejected the State of Florida's argument that
section 92 grants only a very limited permission to sell insurance to the extent
that state law grants such permission."3 First, the Court noted that the
language of section 92 suggests a broad permission to sell insurance."4
Second, the Court explained that section 92's grant of authority to sell
insurance is an "addition to the powers now vested by law in national
[banks].""5 According to the Court, grants of both enumerated and incidental
powers to national banks ordinarily preempt conflicting state law."6
Consequently, under ordinary preemption principles, the Court concluded
that section 92 preempts the anti-affiliation statute."
Further, the Court held that McCarran-Ferguson's special anti-preemption
rule did not apply, because section 92 "specifically relates to the business of
70. The Florida statute provided:
(2) No insurance agent or solicitor licensed by the Department of Insurance under the provisions of
this chapter who is associated with, under contract with, retained by, owned or controlled by, to any
degree, directly or indirectly, or employed by, a financial institution shall engage in insurance
agency activities as an employee, officer, director, agent, or associate of a financial institution
agency.
FLA. STAT. ch. 626.988(2) (1984). The statute also specifically stated that its purpose is to "regulate trade
practices relating to the business of insurance in accordance with the intent of Congress as expressed in the
Act of Congress of March 9, 1945 (Pub. L. No. 15, 79th Congress) [McCarran-Ferguson]...." FLA. STAT.
ch. 626.951(l) (1984).
71. Barnett Bank, 64 U.S.L.W. at 4162. Under the Florida statute, banks that were not subsidiaries or
affiliates of bank holding companies and were located in cities of less than 5000 inhabitants could sell
insurance. Id For the language of the Florida statute, see supra note 70. The "small town" exception comes
from section 92 of the NBA, which allows banks in cities with a population of less than 5000 to sell
insurance. For the language of section 92, see supra note 56.
72. Barnett Bank, 64 U.S.L.W. at4163.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 92).
76. Id. (citing First Nat'l Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U.S. 366, 368-69 (1923) (holding that
national banks' "power" to receive deposits preempts contrary state escheat law); Easton v. Iowa, 188 US.
220, 229-30 (1903) (concluding that the national banking system is normally "independent, so far as powers
conferred are concerned, of state legislation")). Although the cases cited were decided before the enactment
of McCanan-Ferguson and its rule of reverse preemption, the Court concluded that McCaran-Ferguson
does not prevent section 92 from preempting the anti-affiliation statute. See infra notes 78-82 and
accompanying text.
77. Barnett Bank, 64U.S.L.W. at4164.
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insurance.""8 Examining the language of section 92, the Court concluded that
the statute specifically related to the business of insurance, because it focused
directly on industry-specific selling practices and affected the relation of
insured to insurer and the spreading of risk.79 Moreover, the Court explained
that McCarran-Ferguson does not attempt to insulate state insurance
regulations from all federal laws; it only seeks to protect state regulations
from "inadvertant" federal intrusion."0 Because the Court concluded that
section 92 "specifically relates to the business of insurance," it held that
section 92 is not the type of "inadvertant" federal law that McCarran-
Ferguson sought to protect against.
8
'
Thus, after Barnett Bank, state anti-affiliation statutes will not inhibit bank
powers to sell insurance under section 92 of the NBA. 2 However, because
the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank only examined section 92 of the NBA, it
is unclear whether all banks selling insurance products must comply with
state regulations. As the Supreme Court recognized in NationsBank, the
incidental powers clause of § 24 (Seventh) authorizes banks to sell
insurance.83 Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized in Barnett Bank that
grants of enumerated and incidental powers to national banks are not limited
by contrary state law.84 Thus, it appears that national banks should be able to
sell insurance products free from onerous state regulations. However, the
Seventh Circuit, ignoring the Supreme Court's guidance in Barnett Bank,
adopted a contrary approach.
78. Id. at 4164-65. For the relevant language of McCanan-Ferguson, see supra note 61.
79. Id. at 4165. The Court rejected the State of Florida's argument that section 92 specifically relates to
banking, not insurance, because it determined that a statute may specifically relate to more than one thing. Id.
at 4166. The Court explained that "[jiust as an ordinance forbidding dogs in city parks specifically relates to
dogs and to parks, so a statute permitting banks to sell insurance can specifically relate to banks and to
insurance." Id.
80. Id. at 4165.
81. Id.
82. The Court's decision will impact more than just national bank powers, because most states have
laws that ensure that state-chartered banks are able to exercise the same powers as national banks.
Greenhouse, supra note 65, at C6.
83. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
84. Barnett Bank, 64 U.S.L.W. at 4163.
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IV. REGULATING THE SALE OF INSURANCE PRODUCTS BY NATIONAL
BANKS: AMERICANDEPOSIT CORP. v. SCHACHT
American Deposit Corporation ("ADC") developed the Retirement
Certificate of Deposit ("Retirement CD") and licensed it for offering and sale
to Blackfeet National Bank ("Blackfeef'). 5 Although ADC named the
product a certificate of deposit, the terms of the Retirement CD are similar to
those of an annuity.86 The customer deposits a lump sum and selects his
expected retirement date as the date of maturity. 7 Interest on the amount is
tax-deferred 8 and begins to accrue on the date of deposit.89 When the
maturity date arrives, the bank calculates the amount of the monthly payment
by examining the account balance at that time, the customer's age, the
monthly payment interest rate then in effect, and the Society of Actuaries
Annuity Table.90 After the maturity date, the customer receives these fixed
monthly payments until his death.9 He is assured of receiving the entire
account balance regardless of his lifespan; if he has not received the full
amount, the remainder is paid to his designated beneficiary or his estate at
85. American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, No. 95-2462, 1996 WL 252869, at *1 (7th Cir. May 13,
1996). American Deposit Corp. tried to patent the Retirement CD. Before it could do so, First National Bank
of Omaha began marketing a similar tax-deferred annuity CD. Jordan Luke, Recent Developments in Bank
Regulation: A Little Too Good to Be True?, C995 AI-ABA 1, 25 n.27 (1995) (citing BANKING A'rr'VY
March 6, 1995, at 1).
86. See Schacht, 1996 WL252869, at *1.
87. Id The customer must make a minimum initial balance of at least $5000. American Deposit Corp.
v. Schacht, 887 F. Supp. 1066, 1071 (N.D. 11 1995), aff'a No. 95-2462, 1996 WL 252869 (7th Cir. May 13,
1996).
88. Schacht, 887 F. Supp. at 1071. For a discussion of sections 72 and 1275 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which allow holders of certain annuity contracts to defer taxation of interest until they begin receiving
payments, see infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text. Prior to the maturity date, "withdrawals are subject
to penalty and IRS treatment as taxable income." Schacht, 887 F. Supp. at 1071. For tax purposes, monthly
payments are apportioned between interest and principal. Id.
89. Schacht, 1996 WL 252869, at *1. Interest is calculated under a formula tied to the then current
five-year U.S. government treasury note yield. Schacht, 887 F. Supp. at 1071.
The FDIC determined that the principal amount and the accumulated interest on the Retirement CD are
entitled to FDIC insurance, but it refused to insure any additional amounts. Id. at 1072. According to the
FDIC, the value of the lifetime, monthly payments is uncertain and could exceed the total account balance.
Id. If a bank failure occurred before the maturity date, the Retirement CD would be insured to the extent of
the principal and accrued interest to the date of the failure. Id. In the event of a bank failure after maturity of
the Retirement CD, the FDIC agreed to pay the customer the balance of the account at maturity date,
principal plus accrued interest, minus the sum of any withdrawal and monthly payments already made. Id.
90. Schacht, 887F. Supp. at 1071.
91. Id. Once determined, the monthly payments to the customer will remain fixed over the customer's
lifetime. Id. If he chooses, the customer may make a cash withdrawal of up to two-thirds of the account
balance on the maturity date. Id.
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death.92
In 1994, Blackfeet began to market the Retirement CD in Illinois.93
Claiming that Blackfeet was engaging in insurance activities subject to state
regulation, the Illinois Director of Insurance, James W. Schacht, issued a
cease and desist order against Blackfeet.94 ADC and Blackfeet subsequently
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.95
ADC and Blackfeet argued that the Retirement CD is a "deposit'
authorized by § 24 (Seventh) of the NBA96 and thus does not fall within the
Illinois Insurance Code's (the "Insurance Code") definition of "insurance." '9 7
Further, they argued that even if the Retirement CD is classified as an annuity
and falls within the scope of the Insurance Code, the NBA, pursuant to the
"incidental" powers clause in § 24 (Seventh), preempts state attempts to
regulate the sale of the Retirement CD.98 In return, Schacht argued that the
Retirement CD is an "annuity" subject to state insurance regulations9 and
that McCanan-Ferguson immunizes state insurance regulations from
preemption."t
The Seventh Circuit held that Illinois insurance regulations apply to the
sale of the Retirement CD, because the Retirement CD is "insurance" within
92. Schacht, 1996 WL 252869, at *1.
93. Schacht, 887 F. Supp. at 1068. Blackfeet's marketing in Illinois was very limited, it sent
informational packets to ten persons who requested them. Id. In fact, Blackfeet did not accept any deposits
from Illinois residents. Id.
94. Schacht, 1996 WL 252869, at *1.
95. Schacht, 887 F. Supp. at 1068.
96. On May 12, 1994, the OCC issued a no-objection letter in which it determined that the Retirement
CD is a deposit within the traditional banking powers under § 24 (Seventh). Letter from William P. Bowden,
Jr., Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to Jack Kelly, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Blackfeet National Bank (May 12, 1994), cited in David W. Roderer & William B.F. Steinman, The
Authority for Banks to Sell Annuities and Insurance Related Products, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 395,
406 (1994). The OCC relied on "the express authorizations [in § 24 (Seventh)] for the [blank to receive
deposits and enter into contracts, coupled with its powers to incur liabilities and fund its operations... ' Id.
In addition, the OCC explained that the fact that the Retirement CD requires actuarial calculations does not
prevent it from being an "authorized bank product" because "[m]odemizing bank practices to comport with
ever changing customer needs is permissible, provided that the practices remain findamentally what is
authorized by the [National Bank] Act." Id.
97. Shacht, 887 F. Supp. at 1075.
98. Id. at 1079.
99. Id. at 1077. Schacht's argument was simple: because the Retirement CD is an annuity and the
insurance code lists annuities as subject to insurance regulation, the Retirement CD should be subject to
insurance regulation. Id. The court noted that all fifty states regulate annuities under their insurance laws. Id.
(citing Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1295, 1300 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993), rev'd on other
grounds, NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.-Co., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995)).
100. Id. at 1079.
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the meaning of McCarran-Ferguson. ' Additionally, the court concluded that
§ 24 (Seventh) of the NBA does not specifically relate to the business of
insurance, so the NBA, under McCarran-Ferguson, does not preempt the state
regulations.
0 2
First, the court determined that the Illinois regulations were enacted "for
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance."" The court explained
that the regulation requiring prior approval from the Illinois Department of
Insurance before a company may sell any type of insurance is necessary for
the State of Illinois to monitor the relationship between the insurer and its
customers.' Thus, because the regulations "possess the 'end, intention, or
aim' of adjusting, managing, or controlling the business of insurance,"'' 05 they
fall within the scope of McCarran-Ferguson.0 6
Next, the court concluded that the sale of the Retirement CD falls within
McCarran-Ferguson's definition of the "business of insurance."'0 7 The court
examined the Supreme Court's decision in NationsBank that annuities are
investment products rather than insurance' 8 and determined that NationsBank
was distinguishable.'0 9 First, the court noted that the holding in NationsBank
was limited to situations in which the bank is a broker, rather than an
underwriter of the annuity."0 Second, the court explained that the Supreme
Court in NationsBank did not consider whether a bank brokering annuities is
subject to state insurance regulations.' Because of these key factual
differences, the Seventh Circuit in Schacht refused to follow the Supreme
Court's holding that annuities are not insurance."2 The Seventh Circuit noted
that the annuity at issue in NationsBank was a variable annuity, which offers
101. Schacht, 1996 WL252869, at *8.
102. Id. at*9.
103. Id. at *3.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
106. Schacht, 1996 WL 252869, at *3.
107. Id. at *4.
108. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
109. Schacht, 1996 WL 252869, at *4.
110. Id. See supra note 56 for a discussion of this issue. The district court also addressed this
distinction. American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 887 F. Supp. 1066, 1078 (N.D. II1. 1995), alJ'd, No. 95-
2462, 1996 WL 252869 (7th Cir. May 13, 1996). It interpreted NationsBank to mean nothing more than
"that the OCC could reasonably find the selling, as opposed to the underwriting, of annuities was an
incidental power of banking." Id. (citing NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct.
810,815 (1995)).
111. Schacht, 1996 WL252869, at *4.
112. Id.at "4-'6.
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no guarantee that benefits will be payable in fixed amounts." 3 However, the
court concluded that the Retirement CD is similar to a fixed annuity."4
Because the purchase of a Retirement CD involves both a mortality risk and a
guaranteed return, the key characteristics of insurance, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the Retirement CD is insurance within the definition of
McCarran-Ferguson." 5
Finally, the Seventh Circuit examined the relevant language of the NBA,
presumably only the enumerated powers of § 24 (Seventh)," 6 and concluded
that it does not preempt Illinois insurance regulations.' I Because the literal
language of § 24 (Seventh) does not "explicitly" give banks the power to
conduct insurance-related activities or "directly" focus on specific insurance
selling practices, the Seventh Circuit concluded that § 24 (Seventh) does not
"specifically" relate to the business of insurance.'18 Moreover, the court
examined the purposes of McCarran-Ferguson and concluded that in this case
the NBA represented the type of "inadvertent federal intrusion" that
McCarran-Ferguson was designed to guard against; it would allow a broad
statement of federal law, of which insurance comprises only a small part, to
exempt insurance activities from all state regulation. " 9
In Schacht, the Seventh Circuit adopted a misguided approach and
reached an incorrect conclusion. The court's failure to consider the incidental
powers clause of § 24 (Seventh) as a source of national banks' power to sell
insurance was erroneous. In Barnett Bank, the Supreme Court recognized that
the NBA grants national banks the power to sell insurance in both section 92
and the incidental powers clause, and it explained that grants of incidental
powers to national banks generally preempt contrary state laws. :2 The
District of Columbia Circuit, in Independent Bankers Association ofAmerica
v. Heimann, similarly held that section 92 is not the exclusive source of
113. Id. at *6.
114. Id.
115. Id. The Seventh Circuit also noted that virtually all annuities are issued by insurance companies
and that almost all state legislatures regulate annuities as a part of the insurance industry. Id. at *7. Schacht
also made this argument at the district court level. See supra note 99. This is a weak argument because the
Court is assuming that the Retirement CD is an annuity. It has never been designated as such. If the Court
chose to adopt a plain language argument, it should have called the Retirement CD a "deposit' within the
definition of§ 24 (Seventh) of the NBA.
116. Presumably, the Court based its argument only on the powers enumerated in § 24 (Seventh) and
not on the incidental powers clause.
117. Id.at*9.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 64 U.S.L.W. 4161 (1996).
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banks' power to sell insurance.' 2 '
Moreover, there is a fundamental problem with the Seventh Circuit's
holding in Schacht. If state regulations are allowed to preempt the NBA,
states can effectively push banks out of the insurance market by subjecting
them to such burdensome regulations that it is not cost-effective for banks to
sell nondeposit investment products. This result would be contrary to the
Supreme Court's decisions in NationsBank and Barnett Bank, which uphold
national banks' powers to sell such products.' Thus, the Seventh Circuit
should have concluded that the state insurance regulations do not preempt the
NBA. Instead, the court intensified the conflicts between the banking and
insurance industries.
V. REACTION TO THE RETIREmENT CD
Although national banks hail the Retirement CD as an innovative new
product, the reaction of government officials and members of the insurance
industry has not been enthusiastic. Both NationsBank and Schacht indicate
that national banks have the power to sell products such as the Retirement
CD. However, in the wake of Schacht, federal and state legislatures and
administrative officials have attempted to clarify the regulations that will
govem the sale of insurance products.
A. Response at the Federal Level
1. Proposed Legislation
When national banks began to market and sell the Retirement CD,
Congress attacked the product from several angles. Interestingly, legislators
chose not to attack the Retirement CD head-on by amending the NBA to
prohibit national banks from selling insurance products." Instead, proposed
legislation would require national banks to comply with the full range of state
insurance regulations if they choose to sell products such as the Retirement
CD, and to make extensive disclosures to consumers when selling such
121. 613 F.2d 1164, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980).
122. This does not mean that national banks selling insurance should be free from all regulation, but
only that the source of such regulation should be federal and not left to the states.
123. In the wake of the Court's decision in Barnett Bank, some commentators expect House
Republicans to amend pending banking bills to allow banks to affiliate with insurance companies. Kelley
Holland, Banks Unplug a Policy Loophole, Bus. WK., Apr. 8, 1996, at 43.
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products.'24 Finally, the proposed legislation would prevent the Retirement
CD from receiving FDIC insurance."
Rep. Thomas J. Bliley introduced the Insurance State's and Consumers'
Rights Clarification and Fair Competition Act ("Insurance Rights Acf')'26 on
March 24, 1995. The Insurance Rights Act would require that anyone who
sells, underwrites, or solicits the purchase of insurance must comply with all
applicable state insurance regulations.'27 According to Rep. John D. Dingell,
everyone selling or underwriting insurance, including banks, must at least
meet state insurance standards in order to protect consumers and ensure that
insurance products are financially sound.'28 The Insurance Rights Act would
essentially codify the holding in Schacht, allowing national banks to market
and sell products such as the Retirement CD, subject to state regulation.
On March 28, 1995, Senator David Pryor introduced the Bank Customer
Confidentiality and Protection Act of 1995 ("Customer Protection Act"). 129
The Customer Protection Act would limit banks' ability to advertise
nondeposit investment products and would require banks selling such
products to provide specific disclosures to customers130
When banks advertise nondeposit investment products, they would be
unable to mislead consumers by implying that the products are insured or
guaranteed.' In addition, banks could not use bank letterheads, logos, or
names when advertising or selling the products.12 The Consumer Protection
124. See infra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
126. H.R. 1317,104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
127. Id.
128. 141 CONG. REC. E693 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Dingell). Interestingly, Rep.
Dingell is a strong supporter of federal regulation of the insurance industry, because he believes that current
state regulatory schemes are inadequate and incapable of controlling the "interstate and international"
insurance industry. Id.
129. S.633, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
130. Id. § 2(aX3), (6). In February, 1994, the OCC announced that a section dealing with the sale of
retail nondeposit investment products would be added to the Comptroller's Handbook for National Bank
Examiners. OCC Examination Procedures for Nondeposit Investment Sales, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCI)
70-113, at 82,585 (Nov. 10, 1995) [hereinafter OCC PROCEDURES]. This section replaced the OCC
Banking Circular on National Bank Retail Non-Deposit Investment Sales Activities. Id. The OCC
PROCEDURES, which are very similar to Senate Bill 633, provide guidelines for national banks to follow
when marketing and selling products such as the Retirement CD. See id.
131. S. 633, supra note 129, § 2(aX2). Similarly, the OCC PROCEDURES require that banks disclose to
consumers that the products are not FDIC insured, are not deposits or other obligations of the bank or
guaranteed by the bank, and that they involve investment risks. OCC PROCEDURES, supra note 130, at
82,589. Additionally, the OCC PROCEDURES explain that banks could be liable under the antifraud
provisions of federal securities laws if they mislead consumers about the nature of nondeposit investment
products. Id. at 82,586.
132. S. 633, supra note 129, § 2(aX6)(B).
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Act would further require that the place where nondeposit investment
products are sold be physically separated from the banking activities of the
bank and be readily distinguishable by the public as separate and distinct
from the bank.'33 Finally, only qualified brokers whose responsibilities are
limited to the sale of nondeposit investment products would be able sell the
products. 3
4
When a customer opens an investment account or purchases a nondeposit
investment product, FDIC-insured banks would have to disclose, in writing,
that the product is not a deposit, not FDIC-insured, not guaranteed by the
bank, and carries a risk of loss of principal.'35 After providing the disclosure,
banks would have to obtain written acknowledgements of customer
disclosure.
36
The Customer Protection Act would impose substantial costs on national
banks. If a national bank had to develop separate advertising schemes, hire
new employees to sell the products, and maintain physically separate facilities
for those employees, banks would be deterred, and in some cases incapable,
of selling nondeposit investment products.
Finally, on May 3, 1995, Rep. Marge Roukema introduced the Bank
Insurance Fund and Depositor Protection Act of 1995 ("Insurance Fund
Act"),'37 which would exclude bank products such as the Retirement CD from
the definition of a "deposit" under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 138
Senator Alfonse D'Amato introduced a companion bill in the Senate on May
12, 1995."39 The Insurance Fund Act would add 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1)(5)(C) to
clarify that "any liability of an insured depository institution that arises under
133. Id. § 2(aX7). The OCC PROCEDURES contain similar requirements. See OCC PROCEDURES, supra
note 130, at 82,587-88.
134. S. 633, supra note 129, § 2(a)(8). The guidelines of the OCC PROCEDURES are more lenient. They
simply require that individuals selling investment products "have an understanding of securities industry
customer protection and control systems and have an adequate knowledge of the products being offered" and
that banks instruct the sellers "as to the specialized obligations of selling investment products in a retail
banking environment" OCC PROCEDURES, supra note 130, at 82,591.
135. S. 633, supra note 129, § 2(aX3)(B). A bank would also have to disclose the nature of its
relationship to the broker. Id. § 2(aX3)(AXii). The disclosure provision ofSenate Bill 633 is very similar to
the requirements in the OCC PROCEDURES. Seesupra note 131 fora discussion ofthe guidelines.
136. S. 633, supra note 129. The OCC PROCEDURES merely suggest that banks obtain signed
acknowledgements. OCC PROCEDURES, supra note 130, at 82,589.
137. H.R. 1574, 104th Cong., IstSess. (1995).
138. Id.§2.
139. S. 799, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995). Arguing that banks have little or no annuity underwriting
experience, Sen. D'Amato stated that "[the [Bank Insurance] fund must not be used as a safety net for
untested and uncertain investment vehicles." 141 CONG. REC. S6601.02 (daily ed. May 12, 1995) (statement
of Sen. D'Amato).
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an annuity contract, the income of which is tax deferred under section 72 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986" is not a deposit qualifying for FDIC
insurance. 1
40
The Insurance Fund Act would take away a key feature of the Retirement
CD-government insurance. As long as the Retirement CD is treated as an
annuity for tax purposes and earned income is deferred until payments are
received, the Insurance Fund Act is fair. However, if the Retirement CD is
denied both government insurance and tax deferral, as regulators have
proposed,' 4' the product would be rendered completely unmarketable. This
would unfairly disadvantage national banks selling products such as the
Retirement CD that the NBA authorizes them to sell.
2. The OCC Moratorium
As part of the Financial Services Competitiveness and Regulatory Relief
Act of 1995 ("Regulatory Relief Act"), 42 which would repeal the Glass-
Steagall Act'43 and reduce the regulatory burden on financial institutions,
Rep. James A. Leach introduced'" a provision that would impose a five-year
moratorium on the authority of the OCC to authorize new insurance activities
for banks. 145 The Regulatory Relief Act excluded a provision previously
introduced by Rep. Richard Baker, which would have allowed banks to
affiliate with insurance firms where state law permits such links.'46
140. S.799,supra note 139.
141. See infra notes 150-60 (discussing proposals to prevent the Retirement CD from receiving the
benefits of tax deferral).
142. H.R 2520, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). House Bill 2520 represented House Banking Committee
Chairman James A. Leach's synthesis of two bills reported out of committee. See Glass-Steagall Leach
Says He Will Move Bill to Floor, Suggests New Strategy to GOP Leaders, Banking Daily (BNA) (Oct. 30,
1995). The first, House Bill 1062, was a financial services modernization bill reported out of committee in
May, 1995. The second, House Bill 1858, was a bank regulatory reform relief bill approved by the Banking
Committee in June, 1995.
143. The provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act were originally included in the Banking Act of 1933. See
supra notes 24, 26 and accompanying text for further discussion of these provisions.
144. Representative Leach originally introduced the OCC Moratorium in H.R. 1858, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995).
145. See H.R. 2520, supra note 142. On October 19, 1995, Rep. Gerald Solomon, Chairman of the
House Rules Committee, introduced House Bill 2503, which would have imposed a permanent moratorium
on the OCC's authority to authorize new insurance activities for banks. H.RL 2503, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995). Robert Rusbuldt, vice president of the Independent Insurance Agents of America, stated that House
Bill 2503 "clearly is a bill [the insurance industry would] support." Legislation: Leach Expected to Introduce
New Bill; Date for Floor Vote Appears Uncertain, Banking Daily (BNA) (Oct. 20, 1995). The American
Bankers Association's director of retail banking, Philip Corwin, strongly opposed the bill, characterizing it as
"anti-compedtive, protectionist legislation." Id.
146. See H.R. 1858, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995).
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Both the Clinton administration and the American Bankers Association
("ABA") opposed the OCC Moratorium provision. 47 Similarly, the ABA
opposed the proposed limits on the OCC's authority to authorize new bank
insurance activities, stating that the Regulatory Relief Act would "roll back
current bank insurance powers."' 48 Rep. Leach stated that there is "some
chance" of passing the Regulatory Relief Act, but he indicated that there
would be a "substantially stronger chance" of passing the bill if the
controversial insurance provisions were removed.'
3. Proposed Tax Regulation to Deny Tax-Deferred Status
Section 72 of the Internal Revenue Code ("the Code") allows the holder of
an annuity contract to which the section applies to defer all earned income
until distributions on the contract are made. 50 Once distributions under the
contract begin, the holder includes the earnings in income on a pro rata
basis.' Under these provisions, the holder of a Retirement CD could defer
taxation of earned income until she begins receiving monthly payments.
Section 1275(a)(1)(B) of the Code specifically excludes section 72
annuity contracts from the original issue discount ("OD") requirements in
section 1272 of the Code. 52 OD refers to the unstated interest in a deferred
payment' 53 The OD provisions, which treat OD as ordinary interest
income,' 4 require the holder of a debt instrument to include OID in his
147. Glass-Steagall: Leach Says He Will Move Bill to Floor, Suggests New Strategy to GOP Leaders,
Banking Daily (BNA) (Oct. 30, 1995).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See 26 U.S.C. § 72 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
151. Id.
152. Subsection (B) of section 1275(aXl) provides:
Exception for certain annuity contracts
The term "debt instrunent' shall not include any annuity contract to which section 72 applies
and which-
(i) depends (in whole or in substantial part) on the life expectancy of I or more individuals, or
(ii) is issued by an insurance company subject to tax under subchapter I,-
(1) in a transaction in which there is no consideration other than cash or another annuity
contract meeting the requirements of this clause,
(H!) pursuant to the exercise of an election under an insurance contract by a beneficiary thereof
on the death of the insured party under such a contract or
(MI) in a transaction involving a qualified pension or employee benefit plan.
26 U.S.C. § 1275 (aXl)(B) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
153. WILLIAM A. KLEiN& JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDAL INCOME TAXATION 353(9th ed. 1993).
154. 26 U.S.C. § 1271 (1988).
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current income on a constant yield basis, regardless of the holder's overall
accounting method.' Thus, if the Retirement CD is not classified as a section
72 annuity, the holder must include an imputed amount of interest in his
yearly income.
On April 7, 1995, the Internal Revenue Service published a notice of
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register.56 The proposed rule would
significantly reduce the number of annuity contracts qualifying for the section
1275(a)(1)(B)(i) exception, which currently protects all annuity contracts that
depend "on the life expectancy of [one] or more individuals."'5 7 Under the
proposed regulation, an annuity may avoid the OID provisions only if it
provides periodic payments that "(A) [alre made at least annually for the life
(or lives) of one or more individuals, (B) [d]o not increase at any time during
the term of the contract; and (C) [a]re part of a series of payments that begins
within one year of the date of the initial investment in the contract."' 8
Because the payments must begin within one year of the initial deposit, the
proposed rule would effectively deny holders of the Retirement CD the
benefits of tax deferral and subject them to the OID provisions.
Although the proposed rule would strip tax benefits from bank-issued
annuities maturing more than one year beyond the initial deposit, the rule
would not affect annuities issued by insurance companies, because it would
not amend section 1275(a)(1)(B)(ii), which specifically protects annuities
issued by insurance companies.' 9 The inequity of the proposed rule is readily
apparent: bank annuities subject to OID rules would be unable to compete
with functionally identical annuities issued by insurance companies that
would enjoy the benefits of tax deferral."6
155. 26 U.S.C. § 1272 (1988). Forcing the taxpayer to declare income based on a constant yield is
intended to provide a more economically accurate reflection of income and to prevent disparity between
issuer deductions and holder inclusions. This mismatch would occur because the issuer could declare
deductions immediately but the holder could defer all earned income until the years when payments actually
begin. See H.R REP. NO. 432 (Part I1), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1242-43 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 413 (Part I),
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 109(1969).
156. 60 Fed. Reg. 17,731 (1995) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.1275-1) (proposed Apr. 7, 1995).
157. See supra note 152.
158. 60 Fed. Reg. 17,731, 17,733 (1995) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed Apr. 7, 1995)
(emphasis added). The IRS determined that the section 1275(aX)(BXi) exception should not apply to
annuity contracts that provide fbr a significant deferral of income. Id. at 17,732. Presumably, the IRS reached
this conclusion because the longer a taxpayer may defer recognition of income, the wider the gap becomes
between the issuer's deduction and the taxpayer's inclusion in income.
159. See supra note 152.
160. The proposed regulation is particularly unfair when one considers that the Retirement CD is
presumably an "annuity" for purposcs of state regulation. If the Retirement CD is to be regulated as if it is an
annuity, it should also be taxed as an annuity. To treat the product otherwise provides a boon to the insurance
1996]
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Immediately upon release of the proposed rule, Blackfeet sought an
injunction against the proposed regulation because sales of the Retirement
CD had ground to a halt. In Blackfeet National Bank v. Rubin,' the District
Court of the District of Columbia granted Rubin's Motion for Summary
Judgment, holding that the bank had not been denied administrative due
process and that the issue was not ripe for judicial review. 62 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, indicating that the case
wan-anted summary action. 63 Currently, the Internal Revenue Service has not
issued a final regulation.'"
B. Reaction at the State Level
As banks' powers to sell nondeposit investment products expand, some
states have amended their state banking codes to explicitly allow banks to sell
these products. 6 ' Presumably, state legislatures would not want banks in their
states to be at a competitive disadvantage to banks in other states allowed to
sell products such as the Retirement CD. However, states that allow the sale
of nondeposit investment products generally require banks to comply with
state insurance regulations or impose extensive disclosure requirements.'66
industry, because Retirement CDs issued by banks could never compete with products issued by the
insurance industry if they lack similar tax benefits.
The American Bankers Association, in its July 17, 1995 comment letter to the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS"), recognized this unfaimess, stating that "[t]here is no logical justification or policy rationale for the
disparity of treatment between annuity contracts issued by insurance companies and those that are not and
depend (in whole or substantial part) on the life expectancy of one or more individuals." Commentators
Weigh in on IRS Proposal to Change Tax Treatment ofAnnuities, 65 Banking Report (BNA), at 250 (Aug.
7, 1995).
Similarly, at the August 8, 1995 hearing on the proposed regulation, Dennis Gingold, who represented
American Deposit Corporation of Colorado, the company that initially developed the Retirement CD, argued
that "[tihe proposal perpetuates a monopoly by discouraging competition among financial institutions that
essentially are offering the same product" Government Panel Offers Limited Comment at IRS Hearing on
ProposedAnnuity Rules, 65 Banking Report (BNA), at 289 (Aug. 14, 1995).
161. 890 F. Supp. 48 (D.D.C. 1995), afd, 67 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (unreported table decision).
162. Id. at S5.
163. 67 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (unreported table decision).
164. As of June 24, 1996, the Internal Revenue Service has not published a final rulemaking notice in
the Federal Register incorporating the proposed change.
165. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-64-203(bX2)(B) (Michie Supp. 1995) (providing that "a lending
institution ... may be issued a license ... to sell fixed or variable annuities"); IOWA CODE, § 524.802(8)
(Supp. 1995) (authorizing state banks to "[elngage in the brokerage of insurance... subject to the prior
approval of the superintendent").
166. Florida's rule concerning the sale of annuities is very similar to the Consumer Protection Act,
supra note 129, in that it restricts the advertising activities of banks, requires banks to maintain physically
separate facilities for the sale of nondeposit investment products, and requires banks to provide written
disclosures to customers to inform them that the annuity products are not insured or guaranteed. FLA.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Products such as the Retirement CD would allow national banks to
increase profits and compete with other institutions in the financial services
industry. After NationsBank and Barnett Bank, it seems clear that national
banks have the power, under § 24 (Seventh), to sell nondeposit investment
products such as the Retirement CD. However, Schacht indicates that
innovative products may be unfairly subjected to new forms of regulation.
Until the Supreme Court resolves this issue, if national banks choose to sell
products such as the Retirement CD, they will probably be subject to all
insurance regulations applicable to the sale of annuities. By the same token,
as long as products such as the Retirement CD are treated as annuities for
purposes of state regulation, Congress and the states must accord bank
products the same treatment as annuities marketed by the insurance industry.
Jennifer A. Marler
ADMIN. CODEANN. r.3C-100.960 (1996).
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